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Abstract
Option listing increases informed and uninformed trading by 12.4% and 23.9%, respectively, in
the US between 2001 and 2010, hence reducing relative information risk. We establish the causal
effects using control stocks with similar propensities of listing and a quasi-natural experiment using
option listing standards. The beneﬁts are more prominent for stocks with active options trading and
opaque stocks. The reduction of information risk is larger for good news than bad news, and the
stock price response to earnings surprise weakens after listing. The results suggest that options
improve the overall market information environment beyond substitutional effects to stock trading.
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1. Introduction
Derivative assets, such as options, are redundant assets in a frictionless market under geometric
Brownian motions as stock price dynamics, documented in Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton
(1973). However, in the real market, introducing options can have signiﬁcant impact on the under-
lying asset. On the one hand, Ross (1976b) and Hakansson (1982) show that options complete the
market, implying that investors’ trading demand can increase because of hedging purposes. In the
presence of information asymmetry, increased hedging transactions can reduce the probability of
trading against informed traders for uninformed traders. On the other hand, Black (1975) notes that
options can also increase the amount of informed trading because options provide higher leverage
to ﬁnancially constrained informed traders. Similarly, Cao (1999) shows that investors become
more motivated to acquire private signals if options are available. Figlewski and Webb (1993) and
Johnson and So (2012) argue that options facilitate informed trading by relaxing the short-sale
constraint on stocks. All of these studies suggest that option listing leads to more informed trad-
ing, hence higher information risk for uninformed traders. Finally, Biais and Hillion (1994) show
that the option listing effects condition on exogenous parameters. The key result in their model is
that introducing options can potentially solve the market breakdown problem due to information
asymmetry if uninformed traders value the beneﬁt of hedging more than the risk of trading against
informed traders. As a result, both informed and uninformed trading become more active after
options are introduced. If the incomplete market does not break down at the ﬁrst place, the beneﬁt
from expanded trading opportunities is less meaningful for uninformed traders. Biais and Hillion
(1994) show that under certain parameters, uninformed traders trade less because they can hedge
more precisely using options, thus making the liquidity orders less attractive to informed traders.
In this case, option introductions can reduce the incentive of informed traders and the stock price
becomes less efﬁcient.
Given contradicting predictions of option listing effects on trading incentives and the level
of information asymmetry, it is better to examine this question empirically. A large body of the
literature examines the lead-lag relation between the stock and options prices and volumes, and
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ﬁnds mixed evidence regarding options’ contribution to price discovery.1 However, those studies
do not answer the question whether the same amount of information extracted from the twomarkets
can be revealed without options. If options only cause traders to migrate across markets, there may
be no impact on the overall information environment that an uninformed investor faces because
options reduce informativeness of the underlying market. In this case, even if options trading
conveys information not in the stock market, that is insufﬁcient to show that options increase the
total amount of private information revealed to the market. To understand whether options affect
the market information environment beyond substitutional effects, this paper instead focuses on
option listing events.
To gauge overall information asymmetry before and after option listing, we examine the ag-
gregate stock market order ﬂow assuming that options market makers perform full delta hedging.
Under this assumption, the total stock order ﬂow nests the liquidity and information in the options
order ﬂow because options market makers transfer options order ﬂow to the stock market. There-
fore, the dynamic of stock order ﬂow around option listing sufﬁces to describe the overall trading
environment. Admittedly, because of transactions cost and liquidity constraints, full delta hedg-
ing is a strong assumption unlikely to hold in practice despite the fact that delta hedging is now a
standard practice by all options market makers. Nevertheless, the inherent connection between the
options order ﬂow and the stock order ﬂow through delta hedging makes the order ﬂow a better
choice to assess the overall market condition than other variables such as the bid-ask spread and
price volatility. To quantify the level of information asymmetry using order ﬂows, we estimate
the sequence trade model of Duarte and Young (2009) (DY hereafter), which extends the famous
Easley and O’Hara (1992) (EO hereafter) model. The order arrival rates from informed (μ) and
uninformed traders (ε) are two main parameters of the EO model. The other two parameters are
the probability of information events (α) and the probability of an information event being good
news (β). Based on empirical observations that the EO model overlooks simultaneous shocks to
buy and sell orders, DY propose to include a symmetric increase (δ) in both uninformed buy and
1For example, Manaster and Rendleman (1982), Anthony (1988), Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998), Pan and
Poteshman (2006), Bali and Hovakimian (2009), Cremers and Weinbaum (2010), Xing, Zhang, and Zhao (2010),
and Hu (2014) ﬁnd that the options market leads the stock market in price discovery. Studies showing the opposite
result include, for example, Bhattacharya (1987), Stephan and Whaley (1990), Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002), and
Muravyev, Pearson, and Broussard (2013).
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sell orders in a liquidity shock event with a probability of θ, and achieve better data ﬁts. Moreover,
DY show that the original probability of informed trading (PIN) of EO can be decomposed into
an asymmetry component (APIN) and a symmetric liquidity shock component (PSOS). This pa-
per examines the DY model constructs as well as the model parameters to identify the levels and
sources of the listing effects.2
Because options exchanges do not randomly select stocks to list, we follow Mayhew and Mi-
hov (2004) and use the propensity score matching (PSM) method to examine the listing effects
in a sample of 1517 common stocks experiencing option listing in the US between February 11,
2001 and February 28, 2010. Consistent with previous ﬁndings by Mayhew and Mihov (2004)
and Danielsen, van Ness, and Warr (2007), we ﬁnd that options exchanges select stocks based
on the ﬁrm size, trading volume, return standard deviation, bid-ask spread, and industry category.
Moreover, the analysis shows that the selected stocks on average have higher institutional own-
ership, greater buying pressure, and more balanced order ﬂows, consistent with the notion that
options exchanges prefer stocks with large hedging demand, high short selling costs, and low
market-making costs. Each listing stock is then matched to an eligible but non-listing stock with
the closest propensity score of option listing at the same time to construct a control sample.
In the matched sample, the average treatment effect of option listing on the daily volume of
informed trades (μ) is an increase of 12.4% with a t-statistic of 3.07 in the ﬁrst year after option
listing. The treatment effects on the daily volume of uninformed trades (ε) and symmetric shock
to uninformed order ﬂow (δ) average at 23.9% and 14% with t-statistics of 10.01 and 3.51, re-
spectively. There is no signiﬁcant change in the probabilities of information events (α) or liquidity
shocks (θ) although the average impact is negative for both types of events. Due to the dispropor-
tional increases in informed and uninformed trading, the probability of informed trading (APIN) is
reduced by 8.8% with a t-statistic of −6.71. The probability of a trade from a symmetric liquidity
shock (PSOS) is also reduced by 7.2% with a t-statistic of −4.56. We verify the listing effects
using alternative stock order ﬂows, which considers understated options market activity due to
2Using the EO model instead generates largely the same results regarding the option listing effects on informed
and uninformed trading and the level of information asymmetry. We report these results in Section E of the internet
appendix to the paper.
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discrete delta hedging. Therefore, our results hold even if the full delta hedging assumption is
violated. The listing effects are robust to different measures of order ﬂow using the number of
trades or number of shares traded, and are consistent across stock and options exchanges involved
in the listing event. Regression analysis of the treatment effects on an option listing dummy and
control variables shows that option listing effects on the market information environment cannot
be explained by ﬁrm characteristics related to the probability of informed trading as suggested by
Aslan, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2011).
We perform three additional tests to make sure that the ﬁndings are indeed driven by option
listing events. Firstly, concerning that the structural breaks may not occur around the listing date,
we investigate the dynamics of the DY model parameters and the estimated APIN at the quar-
terly frequency. The results show that the most signiﬁcant treatment effects on both informed and
uninformed trading occur in the ﬁrst quarter after option listing. Secondly, the baseline analysis
is repeated in a sample of 56 listing stocks with prices just above the minimum price required
for option listing. The control stocks are the non-listing stocks that have prices just below the
minimum price, but share similar characteristics to the listing stocks. This test is based on the
notion that the mandated minimum stock price splits otherwise identical ﬁrms into the treatment
and control groups and creates a quasi-natural experiment to identify the listing effects. All results
from the baseline analysis hold qualitatively the same in this alternative sample, except that the
option listing effect on PSOS loses statistical signiﬁcance. Finally, we conduct a placebo test on
exchange-traded-fund (ETF) options. Like common stocks, ETFs can also be listed on options ex-
changes subject to the same regulatory requirement. However, private information is less important
for ETFs because such information is usually about speciﬁc ﬁrms and should not have signiﬁcant
price impact on diversiﬁed stock portfolios such as ETFs. Therefore, the option listing impact on
ETFs can be different from that on common stocks. Indeed, we ﬁnd that in a sample of 85 ETFs
that experience option listing during the same period, there is no signiﬁcant change in informed
trading, but only in uninformed trading.
The option listing effects exhibit signiﬁcant cross-sectional heterogeneity. In particular, the re-
duction of APIN is larger for stocks with high options volumes and large options-to-stock volume
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ratios, consistent with the notion that an active options market reveals more private information.
The reduction of APIN is also greater for stocks with large bid-ask spreads, low market capitaliza-
tion, large earnings surprise, little voluntary disclosure, low institutional holding, and low accrual
quality. Since these stocks are associated with weak information environment, the option listing
effect is stronger when other information channels are less effective.
We also ﬁnd that the listing effect is asymmetric on the probability of informed trading based on
good news (APIN Good) and the probability of informed trading based on bad news (APIN Bad).
Although both probabilities are reduced by option listing, the reduction in APIN Good is much
larger and statistically more signiﬁcant than APIN Bad. This is true because getting around short-
sale constraints can be an important motivation of options trading for informed traders. As a result,
the increase in informed selling exceeds the increase in informed buying, and the excess increase
of informed selling curtails the reduction in APIN Bad. Analysis on the probability of informa-
tion being good (β) shows that β becomes signiﬁcantly lower after option listing, suggesting that
options make it easier for informed traders to take advantage of bad news.
The decrease in the overall level of information asymmetry may cause an inference problem for
uninformed traders and reduce price efﬁciency (Stein (1987)). Although more private information
is revealed, the information is clouded by increased noise trading, hence more difﬁcult to learn. For
price efﬁciency to improve in this case, uninformed investors must be sophisticated enough to ﬁlter
out the increased noise. We ﬁnd that the immediate price response to earnings surprise becomes
weaker after option listing while the post-earnings announcement drift does not become stronger.
The results suggest that uninformed investors are able to learn more private information from the
capital markets even though the information is diluted by noise trading. Therefore, introduction
of options also improves price efﬁciency. Finally, to avoid relying exclusively on the DY model,
we examine alternative asymmetry measures including the bid-ask spread, order imbalance, return
standard deviation, realized volatility, and VPIN of Easley, Lopez de Prado, and O’Hara (2012).
Our results indicate that option listing signiﬁcantly reduces these alternative asymmetry measures
as well except the return standard deviation.
This paper’s contribution to the literature is mainly fourfold. First, our analysis of order ﬂow
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is able to capture the trading activity on both stock and options markets through the link of delta
hedging. Therefore, the inference about information asymmetry pertains to the overall market.
Such conclusion cannot be obtained by existing studies that focus only on the stock market.
Second, more importantly, we identify the underlying mechanism of this risk reduction by
examining different types of traders’ activities estimated from the DY model. Although there is
much less attention on these model parameters than the probability of informed trading, these pa-
rameter estimates have important economic meanings to study the dynamics around the listing
event. Kumar, Sarin, and Shastri (1998) show that information risk measured by the adverse se-
lection component of the stock bid-ask spread reduces after option listing. However, they could
not pinpoint the source of the effect by examining the spread, a reduced-form efﬁciency measure.
Our analysis shows that both informed and uninformed traders become signiﬁcantly more active
after option listing but the increase of uninformed trading dominates the increase of informed trad-
ing. Meanwhile, option listing does not signiﬁcantly change the probability of information events.
Therefore, uninformed traders are less likely to trade against informed traders as a result of im-
balanced growth in trading demands. This result is consistent with the theoretical prediction in
Biais and Hillion (1994). To the best of our knowledge, the direct empirical evidence of increased
informed trading intensity after option listing is not documented in the literature.
Third, our cross-sectional analysis on heterogenous option listing effects is new to the literature.
We ﬁnd both options market liquidity and ﬁrm information environment signiﬁcantly affect the role
of options in reducing information asymmetry.
Finally, our results can be used to address an empirical puzzle regarding information asymme-
try and price efﬁciency after option listing. Despite lower information risk after listing documented
by Kumar, Sarin, and Shastri (1998), price efﬁciency improves as shown by Skinner (1990), Ho
(1993), and Kumar, Sarin, and Shastri (1998). This is puzzling because less informed trading
should make the price less efﬁcient. We show that the amount of private information revealed to
the market is actually higher after option listing through more active informed trading, which re-
sults in greater price efﬁciency. Meanwhile, an even larger increase in uninformed trading dilutes
the informed trades and makes information risk lower. Therefore, lower information risk can be
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reconciled with higher efﬁciency.
In addition, the analysis identiﬁes institutional ownership and investor order imbalance as im-
portant determinants of option listing decisions. These ﬁndings are helpful for empirical investiga-
tion into other option listing effects not considered in this paper and more generally the introduction
effects of other derivative securities such as the credit default swap (CDS) and single stock futures
(SSF). The numerical methodology proposed in Section B of the internet appendix can be used to
address the data overﬂow problem in model estimation in other applications.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature
and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selection and matching proce-
dure. Section 4 reports the empirical results of option listing effects on the information environ-
ment. And Section 5 concludes.
2. Related literature and hypothesis development
The investigation of option listing effects has a long history in the ﬁnance literature. The modern
derivative pricing models starting from Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) typically
assume a frictionless market and geometric Brownian motions as stock price dynamics. In this
framework, options can be perfectly replicated by the underlying asset and a cash bond. Therefore,
introducing options has no effect on the underlying asset prices or trading volumes. However, these
two assumptions imply market completeness, which does not hold in practice. If the market is
incomplete, it is possible that introducing options can make the market more complete and increase
investors’ welfare as shown by Ross (1976b) and Hakansson (1982). The improved opportunity
set also implies more trading for hedging purposes. Since the optimizers’ hedging trades do not
dependent on private information, they can be viewed as liquidity or uninformed trades. Therefore,
we have the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Options increase the hedging demand by completing the market. The treatment
effect of option listing on the intensity of uninformed trading is positive.
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If options only increase uninformed trading, the information risk will become lower after op-
tion listing. However, options can also become informed traders’ target. The informational role
of options is ﬁrst noted by Black (1975) as he argues that informed traders can use options to
achieve higher leverage. Figlewski and Webb (1993) ﬁnd an increase in the short interest after
option listing. Since short selling is more likely to be information based (Diamond and Verrecchia
(1987)), relaxing shot-sale constraints can lead to more informed trading. Options can also in-
crease traders’ incentive to collect costly information, resulting in more informed trading as in the
partially rational expectation framework of Cao (1999). Therefore, we have the second hypothesis
below.
Hypothesis 2: Options benefit informed traders by relaxing capital requirement or short-sale
constraint. The treatment effect of option listing on the intensity of informed trading is positive.
Given possible option listing effects on both informed and uninformed trading, the equilibrium
effect on the level of information asymmetry becomes ambiguous. Conceptually, the option listing
effect on the overall level of asymmetry will depend on the magnitude of listing effects on both
types of trades. This problem becomes even more complicated when liquidity and informed trades
are interdependent and the informed traders mimic the liquidity traders as in Biais and Hillion
(1994). In addition to the classic no trade problem under information asymmetry as in Milgrom
and Stokey (1982), Biais and Hillion (1994) show that in an incomplete market with a single
tradable security of stock, the market can break down even without the presence of information
asymmetry. If the beneﬁt of increased hedging opportunity by using options exceeds the potential
loss of trading against informed traders, introducing options solves the no trade problem. As a
result of more liquidity trading, the informed traders also trade more, and more private information
is revealed to the market. However, if there is no breakdown in the incomplete market, option
introduction can reduce the incentive and the proﬁt of the informed traders because the liquidity
traders structure less extreme trades using options to hedge their endowment shocks, making the
liquidity orders less attractive to the informed traders. In line with the argument of Stein (1987)
about information externality, Huang and Wang (1997) reach similar conclusions on information
efﬁciency by noting that option introduction increases the informational trades but also changes
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the information content of the existing allocational trades. Given the contradicting predictions, we
have the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: If option listing affects both informed and uninformed trading, the treatment
effect on the level of information asymmetry can be either positive or negative, depending on the
dominating effect between informed and uninformed trading.
The empirical test strategy for the above hypotheses is nontrivial because neither informed nor
uninformed trading is observable in the market and the information risk is hard to quantify. We
rely on the sequence trade models developed by EO and DY to measure the trading intensity and
information asymmetry. The order arrival rates from informed and uninformed traders are the two
main model parameters that can be estimated using daily order ﬂow data.3 One important result
of this model is that the probability of informed trading (PIN) can be calculated from estimated
model parameters. Unlike price-based measures of information asymmetry such as the bid-ask
spread, PIN focuses on information in order ﬂow and is a quantity-based measure of information
asymmetry. Compared to the price-based measures, PIN has two distinguished advantages. First,
the stock market PIN is able to nest the information in options order ﬂow if options market makers
perform full delta hedging. Delta hedging eventually transmits all stock exposure and stock price
information in the options market to the stock market. Therefore, the total stock order ﬂow sufﬁces
to represent the activities in the two markets under this assumption. This feature is particularly
important when studying the option listing effect on the overall market conditions without utilizing
the options transaction data. Second, the EO model estimates enable empirical tests on all of the
three hypotheses discussed earlier while the reduced-form information measures are silent on the
trading intensity of different types of traders. While there is a long list of studies that examine
PIN as a measure of information asymmetry, investigation into the model parameters is largely
absent.4 The empirical evidence regarding the performance of PIN is mixed. While supporting
evidence of PIN as an asymmetry measure is provided by many studies, e.g., Brown, Hillegeistb,
3Interested readers can refer to the internet appendix for more detail about the EO and DY models in Sections A
and C. The internet appendix also introduces a new maximum likelihood estimation method to circumvent the data
overﬂow problem in Section B.
4One exception is Duarte, Hu, and Young (2015), who compare the estimated probability of information events (α)
from several models.
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and Lo (2004), Vega (2006), Ellul and Pagano (2006), Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007), and
Ellul and Panayides (2016), several studies raise questions on the effectiveness of PIN before
major corporate events, e.g., Benos and Jochec (2007), Aktas, de Bodt, Declerck, and van Oppens
(2007), and Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015). There is also mixed evidence regarding the pricing
effect of PIN, e.g., Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002), Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007),
Duarte and Young (2009), Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009), and Lai, Ng, and Zhang (2014). The
major weakness of the PIN model is pinpointed by DY as that the EO model restricts the buy and
sell orders from simultaneous increases. Motivated by the observed positive correlation between
buy and sell orders, DY introduce a symmetric liquidity shock to the EO model and decompose
the original PIN into an adjusted probability of informed trading, APIN, and a probability of a
trade from symmetric liquidity shocks, PSOS. Since the DY model ﬁts the historical data better
than the EO model, we adopt the DY model in the paper. Nevertheless, we also use the EO
model as an alternative and ﬁnd consistent results in Section E of the internet appendix to the
paper. One limitation of using the EO and DY models is that informed traders can only use market
orders to trade with a market maker in this framework. Theoretically, informed traders can also
choose limit orders if the competition among informed traders is not intense as shown by Kaniel
and Liu (2006). There is also supporting evidence for the information content of limit orders
from laboratory settings (Bloomﬁeld, O’Hara, and Saar (2005) and Bloomﬁeld, O’Hara, and Saar
(2015)) and empirical studies (Barclay, Hendershott, and McCormick (2003), Collin-Dufresne and
Fos (2015), and Baruch, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2015)). Given the data limitation, we are
unable to directly investigate the asymmetry measures based on the limit order book around option
listing. To avoid relying exclusively on the trade sequence models, we instead examine additional
information asymmetry measures to validate our main result.
Most empirical studies on option introductions focus on the underlying asset price or volatil-
ity.5 In sparse empirical analysis of the option listing effects on stock market quality, Kumar, Sarin,
and Shastri (1998) ﬁnd that the stock market bid-ask spread narrows and the quote depth increases
5For example, studies on option listing impact on the underlying price include Branch and Finnerty (1981), Conrad
(1989), Detemple and Jorion (1990), Sorescu (2000), and Danielsen and Sorescu (2001). Studies on option listing
impact on the underlying volatility include Conrad (1989), Skinner (1989), Fedenia and Grammatikos (1992), Kumar,
Sarin, and Shastri (1998), Bollen (1998), and Mayhew and Mihov (2004).
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after option listing, indicating that information asymmetry reduces. Danielsen, van Ness, and Warr
(2007) show that the bid-ask spread starts decreasing even before option listing. Both studies,
however, are subject to a criticism of Mayhew and Mihov (2004), that option listing decisions are
endogenous. In a matched sample, Mayhew and Mihov (2004) ﬁnd that option listing has the same
impact on the volatilities of both listing and control stocks and the treatment effect is negligible.
One limitation of the existing empirical studies is that the samples often end before 2000 when the
options market in the United States was not yet a consolidated national market (Battalio, Hatch, and
Jennings (2004)). The option listing effects can be greatly undermined by lack of price competition
and illiquidity in the options market at that time. The options market has developed signiﬁcantly as
a result of more stringent regulations and technology innovations since then. Therefore, investigat-
ing a recent sample period can provide timely and more relevant information about the underlying
effects of option listing. In this paper, we followMayhew and Mihov’s method to create a matched
sample of option listing after 2000. We then investigate the treatment effect of option listing on
the DY model parameters as well as the model constructs, APIN and PSOS. Although predictions
about option listing effects on the probability of information events (α), the probability of liquidity
events (θ), the liquidity shock order ﬂow (δ), and the probability of liquidity shock trading (PSOS)
are not contained in the theoretical models discussed in the paper, empirical evidence of additional
option listing effects can be important for future research. For example, several recent studies ex-
plore liquidity dynamics and the asset pricing implication (see Bali, Peng, Shen, and Tang (2014)
and Chordia, Hu, Tong, and Subrahmanyam (2015)). The option listing effect on θ, δ, and PSOS
may provide insight on the sources of liquidity shocks.
The existing literature lacks discussion on heterogenous option listing effects in the cross sec-
tion. From a social planner’s standpoint, it is important to understand what kind of stocks beneﬁt
more from options listing. We posit that the option listing effects on information asymmetry de-
pend on at least two types of ﬁrm characteristics, namely the options market liquidity and ﬁrm
information environment. Consider options market liquidity ﬁrst. Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988)
point out that options are not beneﬁcial to informed traders without sufﬁcient liquidity in the mar-
ket. Empirically, Holowczak, Simaan, and Wu (2006) and Hu (2014) show that the informational
role of options strengthens when the options market is active. Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam
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(2009) argue that stocks with high options volumes have more efﬁcient prices and enjoy higher
valuation. Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2010) and Johnson and So (2012) ﬁnd that the
options to stock volume ratio conveys stock price information. All these studies highlight the im-
portance of options volumes in the feedback effect on the underlying market. Therefore, we have
the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: The option listing effect on the adjusted probability of informed trading, APIN,
is larger for stocks with more liquid options.
Next, we turn to the ﬁrm information environment. In addition to security trading, private
information can be disseminated through several other channels. For example, the role of stock
analysts in mitigating information asymmetry is well documented in the literature (e.g., see Holden
and Subrahmanyam (1992), Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), Barth and Hutton (2004), and Ellul and
Panayides (2016)). Firms can also provide voluntary disclosure to reduce information asymmetry.
Empirically, Balakrishnan, Billings, Kelly, and Ljungqvist (2014) show that ﬁrms use earnings
guidance as an substitute to analyst coverage. Institutions with signiﬁcant holding of the stock
can also be motivated to collect more private information as shown by Bushee and Noe (2000),
Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta (2005), and Amihud and Li (2006). All these information channels
can be substitutional to each other regarding a ﬁrm’s fundamental information. Therefore, we have
the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5: The option listing effect on the adjusted probability of informed trading, APIN,
is stronger for less transparent stocks before listing.
The calculation of APIN is not affected by the probability of news being good or bad. How-
ever, the option listing effect can be asymmetric for the two types of information due to short-
sale constraints. Options relax such constraints but the beneﬁt is relevant only for informed
traders to sell before bad news. Therefore, the likelihood of informed selling should increase
more than informed buying. Ceteris paribus, the reduction in the adjusted probability of in-
formed trading should be larger for good news than for bad news. Following Brennan, Huh,
and Subrahmanyam (2015), we decompose APIN into a probability of informed trading based
on good news (APIN Good = β∗APIN) and a probability of informed trading based on bad news
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(APIN Bad = (1−β)∗APIN). And we propose the following testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6: The option listing effect on the adjusted probability of informed trading con-
ditioning on good news, APIN Good, is more negative than that on the adjusted probability of
informed trading conditioning on bad news, APIN Bad.
Finally, we concern the impact of option listing on price efﬁciency of the underlying stock.
The effect is not straight-forward given potential offsetting effects from informed and uninformed
trading. On the one hand, more trading activity from informed traders after option listing can
bring more information to the market and potentially make the stock price more efﬁcient. On the
other hand, increased uninformed trading and expanded trading set of informed traders can make
the private information more difﬁcult to learn as argued by Stein (1987), Grossman (1988), and
Back (1993). Therefore, the overall effect is ambiguous. In an experimental setting, de Jong,
Koedijk, and Schnitzlein (2006) ﬁnd that the introduction of options leads to more aggressive
insider trading and improves price efﬁciency. The empirical literature typically addresses the issue
by examining the price behavior after public information shocks such as earnings announcements.
If options trading makes the stock price more efﬁcient by revealing private information before
announcements, price reaction to announcement surprise should become less signiﬁcant. Early
studies such as Skinner (1990) and Ho (1993) support this hypothesis. However, Mendenhall
and Fehrs (1999) ﬁnd that after 1986, stocks with options exhibit slightly larger price reaction to
earnings surprise than stocks without options. The results in these studies are also clouded by the
early sample period examined and lack of matching based on the probability of receiving treatment.
Using a listing-probability matched sample from a recent period, we test the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 7: Options trading improves stock price efficiency. Therefore, the immediate price
response to earnings surprise becomes weaker after option listing.
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3. Data, sample selection, and matching
3.1. Option listing stocks
Information on option listing events is acquired from the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC)
between February 11, 2001 and February 28, 2010. Included in the analysis are only new listing
stocks that have no options traded at any options exchange in the US at the time of listing. The
main analysis excludes options on indices and ETFs and focuses on single name equity options
(CRSP code 10 and 11) because information asymmetry considered in this study is less relevant
for diversiﬁed portfolios. To construct explanatory variables for listing decisions, a listing ﬁrm
must have valid price information in the CRSP database and valid transaction data in the NYSE
TAQ database for at least 252 trading days prior to the option listing date. To study the treatment
effect, the options must continue trading for at least 252 trading days after listing. Options can
also be delisted and relisted later. If a stock has more than one qualiﬁed listing event during the
sample period, only the ﬁrst record is used. The ﬁnal sample includes 1517 observations. Table 1
shows the number of new listings every year during the sample period. The number of new listings
increases gradually in the ﬁrst half of the sample period and peaks at 246 in 2004. It decreases
slightly afterward and remains 143 in 2009. The sample covers only the ﬁrst two months in 2010
and there are 27 option listing events in those two months. The time series pattern shows that there
are active option listings in the entire sample period.
[Table 1 about here]
3.2. Eligible non-listing stocks
We follow Mayhew and Mihov (2004) and constructs a sample of control stocks that are eligi-
ble, but not selected, for option listing. Mayhew and Mihov (2004) document detailed regulation
changes in option listing standards imposed by the SEC before 1997. Comparing the current re-
quirements with the requirements at the end of their sample period, several differences are noted:
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(i) the requirement of minimum trading volume has been removed; (ii) a stock can have options
ﬁve days after its initial public offering (IPO) now, while previously it had to be traded for at least
twelve months after IPO; (iii) the minimum security price is reduced from $7.50 to $3.00. The
other three requirements remain unchanged: (1) the stock must be listed on a national exchange;
(2) the stock must have at least seven million publicly held shares; (3) there must be at least two
thousand shareholders. This paper deﬁnes eligible stocks for option listing in the next month as
those meeting requirements (1) and (2) at the end of each month with the price above $3.00,6 but
having no options trading history in the previous year, and having at least 252 trading days in the
CRSP database. Mayhew and Mihov (2004) argue that it is practically impossible to ﬁlter accord-
ing to requirement (3) because many shareholders hold shares in street names, and this omission
is unlikely to misclassify qualiﬁed stocks. Therefore, this listing criterion is also deactivated in
this study. We adopt more stringent criteria about the trading history due to the needs of con-
structing explanatory variables for listing decisions. Insider holdings data is extracted from the
Thomson Reuter’s insider database and daily stock price and volume data from the CRSP. The
ﬁltering generates 140,277 eligible ﬁrm-month observations during the entire sample period. The
annual breakdown is also reported in Table 1. As equity options become more common over time,
the pool of eligible stocks for listing shrinks from 18,117 observations in 2001 (1,647 stocks per
month) to 9,792 observations in 2009 (816 stocks per month).
3.3. Determinants of the option listing and matching listing to non-listing
stocks
Options exchanges have the incentive of listing stocks that are likely to generate large options
volumes. In practice, new listing proposals are initiated by options market makers afﬁliated with
the exchanges. These market makers are typically reputable brokerage houses or hedge funds that
are able to collect and process large amounts of data from both public and private sources. Previous
6The minimum price requirement was relaxed at the beginning of the sample period of this study. For example,
Hecla Mining Co. (ticker: HL) was traded at $4.27 when its options were listed on January 22, 2003, and Golden Star
Resources, Ltd (ticker: GSS) was traded at $3.77 when its options were listed on October 6, 2003. Therefore, setting
the minimum price to $3.00 is unlikely to bias the sample toward penny stocks in this recent sample period.
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studies on determinants of option listings ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects of the ﬁrm size, trading volume,
return standard deviation, industry classiﬁcation (Mayhew and Mihov (2004)) and the percentage
bid-ask spread (Danielsen, van Ness, and Warr (2007)). In addition to these easily observable
variables, we investigate the role of three other ﬁrm characteristics in the listing decisions:
1. Volume order imbalance (VOI). Stock order imbalance can reﬂect the difﬁculty of short
selling. Pessimistic investors are less likely to participate in trading in the presence of short-sale
constraints and stock order imbalance can become positively biased. As an alternative to short
selling, options on such stocks can generate high trading volumes, and options exchanges should
prefer to list these stocks to attract short sellers. Therefore, a positive relation is expected between
order imbalance and the likelihood of option listing. In this paper, the order imbalance is deﬁned
as (B− S)/(B+ S), where B and S denote daily buyer-initiated and seller-initiated dollar trading
volumes, respectively. The Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm is employed to determine the trade
direction. Unlike Lee and Ready, however, we do not apply a ﬁve-second delay in matching quotes
and trades because this reporting lag is found absent after 1998 as shown by Madhavan, Porter,
and Weaver (2005) and Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005). Speciﬁcally, if a transaction
is executed at a price above (below) the midpoint of the contemporaneous National Best Bid and
Offer (NBBO) prices, it is classiﬁed as buyer-initiated (seller-initiated). For trades falling on the
mid quote price, they are classiﬁed as buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) if the last price change is
positive (negative).
2. Absolute volume order imbalance (AVOI). Intuitively, this variable measures the magnitude
of the unsigned order imbalance that relates to liquidity and market making costs.7 It is more
challenging for options market makers to perform delta hedging in an imbalanced stock market
because options market makers usually do not make market for the underlying stock and may need
to pay the bid-ask spread when performing delta hedging.8 When order ﬂow is imbalanced, options
market makers need to compete with other liquidity demanders to hedge the options positions,
7The absolute imbalance has the same information as the variance of order imbalance in the cross section. Chordia,
Hu, Tong, and Subrahmanyam (2015) provide both theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence that the variance of
order imbalance captures the liquidity dynamic in the presence of informed traders.
8Options market makers can also use limit orders in the stock market, which reduces the trading costs but increases
the likelihood of failure in hedging if the limit order is not executed.
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increasing the uncertainty of delta hedging costs. Therefore, options exchanges should prefer to
list stocks with small absolute volume order imbalance. Using AVOI as a potential determinant
for option listing also mitigates the concern that the option listing decision might be based on
the dynamics of information asymmetry. Easley, Engle, O’Hara, and Wu (2008) show that the
probability of informed trading (PIN) in the original EO model is approximately equal to the
expectation of the absolute order imbalance E[ |B−S|B+S ]. Therefore, including this variable in the
selection model controls for the pre-listing dynamic of the information environment itself.
3. Institutional ownership. Institutional ownership has contradicting effects on the likelihood of
option listing. On the one hand, institutional investors are more likely to trade options if they do not
have contractual or legal restrictions from using equity options for hedging purposes.9 Therefore,
options exchanges should prefer stocks with large institutional ownership to cater to their hedging
demand. On the other hand, institutional ownership is negatively related to the stock borrowing
cost for short sellers because institutional investors provide the most supply in the security lending
market. Therefore, options exchanges may select stocks with low institutional ownership to attract
short sellers targeting those stocks. The overall effect of institution holdings is thus unclear.
Both Mayhew and Mihov (2004) and Danielsen, van Ness, and Warr (2007) use a long-term
average version and a short-term abnormal version of each independent variable to predict option
listings. To improve the prediction accuracy, this study considers the innovations in the indepen-
dent variables as an additional type of determinant. This is achieved by adding further lagged
variables to the model. At the end of each month, for each of the explanatory variables except
return standard deviation and institutional ownership, we calculate the average daily values in the
previous year (t−1, t−12), the previous month (t−1), and twelve months ago (t−12). Return
standard deviation (STD) is calculated using daily stock returns in the three measurement win-
dows. Institutional ownership is updated at quarterly frequency. Constructing three variables from
scarce observations can lead to serious multicollinearity. Therefore, we use only the most recent
value (t−1) and the one-year lagged value (t−12) of institutional ownership. To investigate de-
terminants of option listings, we estimate the following model using logistic regressions in the full
9A recent study of Natter, Rohleder, Schulte, and Wilkens (2016) shows that over 87% of actively managed US








where the dependent variable, Listingt is a dummy variable equal to one for listing stock-month
observations and zero otherwise, Sizet−1 is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization at
the end of month t−1, all Volume and STD variables are in natural logarithm for standardization,
percentage spread (Spread) is calculated as 2(ask-bid)/(ask+bid) at the market close, Industry is
a vector of 71 industry dummy variables based on the two-digit SIC code, and Year is a vector of
year dummies to control for time ﬁxed effects. Firm subscription is omitted for all variables in the
equation for brevity.
The estimation results are reported in Table 2. To establish a benchmark, the ﬁrst model uses
only independent variables that have been used in previous studies. All variables have predictive
ability with signiﬁcant coefﬁcient estimates at the 1% level. Speciﬁcally, large stocks and stocks
with high volatility and low bid-ask spread are more likely to be listed, consistent withMayhew and
Mihov (2004) and Danielsen, van Ness, and Warr (2007). However, the effect of trading volume
is not clear. The long-term trading volume has a negative coefﬁcient estimate, but the short-term
volume has a positive one, both signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The second model includes one-
year lagged trading volume, volatility, and spread. All lag variables have signiﬁcant coefﬁcient
estimates while the original predictors retain the predictive ability. The results reveal important
information about the dynamics of trading volume, volatility, and spread of the listing stocks. At
one year before the listing date, these stocks have lower trading volume, higher volatility, and larger
percentage spread than non-listing stocks. Approaching the listing date, however, these stocks
experience an increase in trading volume and a decrease in percentage spread, while the volatility
remains high. The ﬁndings are consistent with the pre-listing spread dynamic as in Danielsen, van
19
Ness, and Warr (2007).
[Table 2 about here]
The last column in Table 2 reports the full speciﬁcation test results of Equation (1). With
additional explanatory variables, ﬁrm size becomes an insigniﬁcant predictor for option listing de-
cisions. Stock trading volume is still a signiﬁcant predictor at all lags with similar magnitude of
coefﬁcient estimates. The volatility and spread effects slightly weaken. The new variables, namely
the volume order imbalance, absolute volume order imbalance, and institutional ownership are
important determinants of option listing because all of these variables have statistically signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient estimates. The recent and one-year average buy pressures measured by the volume order
imbalances (VOI) positively and signiﬁcantly predict option listings, while the one-year lagged or-
der imbalance has an insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient estimate. This result is consistent with the prediction
that options exchanges prefer stocks with higher short-selling costs because short-sale constraints
are likely to sideline sellers and make VOI more positive. Introducing options on such stocks
can potentially attract high trading volumes from short sellers. Both of the recent and one-year
absolute volume order imbalances (AVOI) negatively predict option listings and the coefﬁcient es-
timate is positive for the lagged absolute imbalance, suggesting that the listing stock’s order ﬂow
becomes more balanced over time and is more balanced than unselected stocks at the time of list-
ing. This result is consistent with the conjecture that options exchanges prefer stocks with low
market-making costs. The dynamic of the absolute order imbalance also suggests that information
asymmetry can play a role in the option listing decision. Growth in institutional ownership also
predicts option listings. At one year before the listing date, the listing stocks have signiﬁcantly
lower institution holdings than unselected stocks. At the time of listing, however, the listing stocks
have signiﬁcantly higher institutional ownership, suggesting that the hedging demand of institu-
tions outweighs the consideration of catering to excess short interests. The full model generates
the highest McFadden’s pseudo-R squared out of the three models in Table 2 and has the highest
accuracy ratio. Therefore, we use the full-model prediction to match stocks later.10
10Matched samples based on the other models in Table 2 generate largely the same results, which are available upon
request.
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As a summary of the logistic regression results, we ﬁnd that when selecting stocks for listing,
options exchanges consider both the concurrent level and the dynamic of several stock character-
istics. The probability of option listing is higher for stocks experiencing recent increases in the
trading volume, volatility, volume order imbalance, and institutional ownership, and decreases in
the bid-ask spread and absolute order imbalance. The uncovered pre-listing dynamics of liquidity-
related variables such as the bid-ask spread, trading volume, and order imbalance are particu-
larly important for analysis on listing effects because these trends may continue after listing, and
changes in the informational environment might be caused by the same variables that affect options
exchanges’ decisions (selection effect) rather than the treatment effect of option listing. Therefore,
it is critical to use a control group of stocks with similar characteristics including pre-listing dy-
namics to disentangle the selection effect and the treatment effect.
After obtaining the propensity score of option listing, we match each listing stock to the eligible
non-listing stock with the closest propensity score in the same calendar month. The matching
is done without replacement and once a non-listing stock is matched, it exits the pool of non-
listing stocks for one year before it becomes available for matching again to avoid overlapping
observations. No signiﬁcant difference of average ﬁrm characteristic is observed between the
listing and matched non-listing stocks as shown in the internet appendix Section D.
4. Option listing effect on the information environment
This section performs empirical tests about the effects of option listings on the overall market
information environment. Since the study focuses on the information in investors’ order ﬂow, the
structural break should occur when options become available to investors but not when the listing
decisions are announced. Therefore, the event day (day 0) is deﬁned as the listing date recorded by
the OCC. The analysis leaves a one-month window around the listing date11, and deﬁnes the event
11Not all options become available immediately on the listing date if the appointed market maker is not ready for
providing quotes. There can be several days of delay before the options are quoted and traded on the exchange.
Moreover, the options market makers usually need to establish a reasonable inventory of the underlying stocks before
options trading starts. Their purchase of the underlying stocks can cause uninformative order imbalance before the
listing date and potentially contaminate the measure of information asymmetry.
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year before listing as trading days [−262,−11] and the event year after listing as trading days [11,
262].
4.1. Baseline test
We estimate the DY model in the two event windows for all of the listing and control stocks and
calculate the paired difference between the two groups as the treatment effect of option listing.
The results are reported in Table 3. Panel A presents the cross-sectional averages of the estimated
model parameters, APIN, and PSOS for the two groups. The probability of information events
(α) and the probability of liquidity shocks (θ) are almost unaltered in both groups after the listing
event. The order arrival rates are reported in natural logarithm for cross-sectional standardization.
In both groups, all three of the order arrival rates increase after listing. The average probability
of informed trading (APIN) of the listing stocks is 15.5% before listing and 13.3% after listing.
The average APIN of the control stocks is 16% before listing and 14.9% after listing. A similar
reduction is observed for the probability of a trade from liquidity shocks (PSOS) in both groups.
Panel B reports the average changes in the model parameters and constructs after option listing,
and the treatment effects with robust t-statistics. To account for cross-sectional variation in the
parameters, the changes are calculated as log differences to approximate percentage changes. On
average, the listing stocks experience signiﬁcant increases in the probability of information events
(α), arrival rate of informed orders (μ), symmetric liquidity shock order ﬂow (δ), and arrival rate
of uninformed orders (ε), but no signiﬁcant change in the probability of liquidity shocks (θ). The
probability of informed trading (APIN) and the probability of a trade from liquidity shocks (PSOS)
decrease by 15.7% and 16.8%, respectively. As expected, the control stocks exhibit similar changes
in all the variables. To identify the treatment effect, the last column in Panel B reports the averages
of the paired differences between the listing group and the control group. On the one hand, the
listing effects on the probability of information events (α) and probability of liquidity shocks (θ)
are both negative but statistically insigniﬁcant. On the other hand, the listing effects on all three
order ﬂow variables are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Speciﬁcally, option
listing on average increases the informed order ﬂow (μ), symmetric liquidity shock order ﬂow (δ),
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and uninformed order ﬂow (ε) by 12.4%, 14%, and 23.9%, respectively. The results support both
Hypotheses 1 and 2. The average treatment effects on APIN and PSOS are −8.8% and −7.2%,
respectively. Quantifying the selection effect using the results on the control group in the second
column, it is found that the treatment effects on APIN and PSOS are at the same magnitude as the
selection effect.
The above analysis shows that the reduction in information asymmetry could be due to imbal-
anced growth in the three order ﬂow variables. While the percentage analysis might potentially
overstate the change due to a small initial value, we explicitly examine the economic signiﬁcance
of option listing by focusing on a relative measure of order ﬂows. Note that in the DY model,







Given insigniﬁcant treatment effect on α, the listing effect on APIN is largely determined by the
intensity of uninformed trading (θδ+ ε) relative to the intensity of informed trading (μ) in the
denominator of the above equation. We term this relative order ﬂow variable ROF and it is clear
that a larger ROF leads to a lower APIN. We ﬁnd that the average ROF is 0.86 (0.84) for listing
(control) stocks before listing, and 1.061 (0.946) after listing. Although both listing and control
stocks have higher ROF after option listing, the increase is much larger on the listing stocks. The
treatment effect on ROF reaches 0.094 with a t-statistic of 4.76.
The results in this subsection indicate that option listing signiﬁcantly reduces the probability
of informed trading in the market. Moreover, this change is not due to change in the probability of
information events but disproportional increases in uninformed and informed trading. Both types
of traders become more active when options are available but the increase in uninformed trading
outweighs the increase in informed trading, reducing the likelihood of trading against an informed
trader.
[Table 3 about here]
23
4.2. Robustness
This subsection conducts robustness tests on the baseline results documented in the previous sub-
section to warrant the causal inference regarding option listing effects.
4.2.1. Deviation from full delta hedging assumption
The key assumption in our analysis is full delta hedging. Only under this assumption the stock
order ﬂow perfectly represents trading in both stock and options markets. In this subsection, we
investigate the effect of discrete delta hedging on our inference of option listing effects. The mod-
ern option pricing research is generally motivated by the non-arbitrage argument, which implies
full delta hedging by liquidity providers (see, e.g., Merton (1973) and Ross (1976a)). The role
of transactions cost in replication and hedging is also studied by Leland (1985), Boyle and Vorst
(1992), and Longstaff (1995). However, without detailed information on options market makers’
positions in all securities, how frequently delta hedging is performed on option positions remains
largely unknown to academics. Indirectly, Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998), Holowczak, Hu,
and Wu (2014), and Hu (2014) ﬁnd that options delta order ﬂow strongly affects the contempo-
raneous stock prices, indicating that delta hedging could occur within the test horizon in these
studies. While Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) and Hu (2014) mainly examine the inter-day
dynamics, Holowczak, Hu, and Wu (2014) show clear contemporaneous price impact from options
delta imbalance at all frequencies they examine ranging from ﬁve seconds to ﬁfteen minutes.
Although the true delta hedging frequency and total hedging volumes cannot be empirically
identiﬁed, our conversations with options market makers yield a consistent remark that the mar-
ket makers typically go home “ﬂat”. Having little inventory risk overnight is also consistent with
the market making practice in other security markets. Therefore, the imbalance in options delta
should always be hedged in the underlying stock market at the end of the day regardless of the
hedging frequency. If the market maker performs discrete hedging and waits for offsetting trades,
some symmetric positions in long and short delta may not lead to delta hedging, resulting in lower
trading volumes in the underlying stock than full delta hedging. In this case, the stock order ﬂow
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underestimates the total trading activities in the two markets. Estimating the DY model with lower
buy and sell volumes are likely to lead to spurious inferences about option listing effects. To un-
derstand the potential bias due to the unhedged delta volumes, it is important to note that the gap
between the observed stock order ﬂow and unobservable total order ﬂow is the same for both the
buyer-initiated and seller-initiated volumes because the unhedged volumes should be netted out.
To recover the unobserved total order ﬂow, we set the unhedged volume to be 25%, 50%, 75%,
and 100% of the total options trading volume of the same stock on a day. After adding half the un-
hedged volume to both the buy and sell stock volumes on the same day, we estimate the DY model
using these alternative order ﬂow numbers and reexamine the listing effects. Note that since there
is no options trading on the listing stocks before listing or on the control stocks during the entire
event period, we perform this volume adjustment only for the listing stocks after listing. Table 4
reports the results using these alternative volumes. Compared to the main results in Table 3, we
ﬁnd that the volume adjustment does not signiﬁcantly change the treatment effects of option listing
on any of the DY model parameters or the model constructs. The volume adjustment has similar
effects to symmetric liquidity shocks in the DY model. Indeed, we ﬁnd that the listing effect on
the liquidity shock order ﬂow (δ) increases as the volume adjuster increases from 25% to 100%.
Larger estimates of liquidity trading also lowers APIN and increases PSOS. Therefore, the listing
effect on APIN becomes marginally smaller and the effect on PSOS becomes marginally larger.
Nonetheless, the reduction in APIN remains at 7.5% with a t-statistic of −5.48 even when the
unhedged options volume reaches 100%. The analysis in this subsection indicates that our conclu-
sions about the option listing effects do not critically depend on the full delta hedging assumption.
[Table 4 about here]
4.2.2. Alternative model estimation and subsample analysis
We ﬁrst estimate the DY model using number of trades instead of trading volumes and report
the difference-in-difference analysis results in Column (1) of Table 5. Comparing the treatment
effects in this column to the main results in Table 3, it is clear that the same pattern exists that both
informed (μ) and uninformed trading (ε) increase and the effect of the latter dominates, resulting
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in a lower probability of informed trading. The magnitude of the estimated listing effects and the
statistical signiﬁcance are also close to those in Table 3.
[Table 5 about here]
The second robustness test concerns that the listing stocks of the full sample come from all
stock exchanges in the US, but the NASDAQ is traditionally a dealers’ market, making the infer-
ence of order ﬂow potentially different from that of a specialists’ market such as the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE). We then divide the full sample into two subsamples based on the stock
exchange of the listing stock and report the listing effects in Column (2) for NASDAQ stocks and in
Column (3) for NYSE and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) stocks. The pattern of the param-
eter dynamics in these two columns is consistent with the main ﬁndings. Interestingly, the option
listing effects on the order ﬂow variables are greater for NYSE and AMEX stocks but the listing ef-
fects on APIN and PSOS are weaker for the same stocks, suggesting that the imbalanced growth in
informed and uninformed trading is more prominent for NASDAQ stocks. NASDAQ stocks, gen-
erally with smaller market capitalization, can be less transparent than NYSE and AMEX stocks on
average. Therefore, options trading as an additional information channel is possible to have larger
effects on NASDAQ stocks in reducing information asymmetry. We formally revisit the impact of
ﬁrm information environment in Subsection 4.3 when we test Hypothesis 5.
There might be concerns that the baseline results are contaminated by the great ﬁnancial crisis
(GFC) in 2008 because of extreme stock market volatilities. Moreover, the short selling ban during
the crisis period can also have signiﬁcant impact on options trading (see, for example, Grundy,
Lim, and Verwijmeren (2012)). To isolate the effect of GFC, Column (4) excludes the option
listing events in 2008 and 2009 and replicates the baseline analysis. The estimated listing effects
are almost identical to the baseline results in Table 3. In an unreported test using only observations
during GFC, no signiﬁcant results are found on the treatment effects, suggesting that the option
listing effects come from the non-GFC period only.
Next, we examine the option listing effects conditioning on which options exchange is involved.
In our sample, the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE) is the most active participant in
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listing new options.12 Out of the 1517 events examined in the study, CBOE is involved in 676
listings. Given CBOE’s unique industry position and longest history of trading options, Columns
(5) and (6) report the listing effects in the subsamples of CBOE listings and non-CBOE listings,
respectively. While the parameter dynamics generally show the same pattern in the two columns,
it is found that CBOE listings exhibit a smaller increase in informed trading (9.9% versus 14.3%)
but a much larger increase in uninformed trading (32.2% versus 17.7%) than non-CBOE listings.
As a result, the reductions in APIN and PSOS for CBOE listings almost double the reductions
for non-CBOE listings. Increased informed trading increases the cost of delta hedging for options
market makers because the order ﬂow is more likely to be imbalanced. It is possible that as the
oldest options exchange, CBOE and its market makers are better at selecting stocks to manage
their hedging costs.
4.2.3. Controlling for ﬁrm dynamics
Aslan, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2011) ﬁnd that several ﬁrm characteristics explain the cross-




where Growth is the annual growth rate in sales, Age is the length of history in CRSP, Analyst
is the number of analysts following the company, Turnover is the annual stock market trading
volume scaled by shares outstanding, Insider is the percentage ownership of company insiders,
Accrual is the estimate of the discretionary component of total accruals, ROA is return on asset
calculated as net income after depreciation over total asset, TobinQ is the market value of equity
12Eight options exchanges operated in the US during the sample period including the American Stock Exchange,
Better Alternative Trading System, Boston Options Exchange, Chicago Board Options Exchange, International Secu-
rities Exchange, NASDAQ, New York Stock Exchange ARCA, and Philadelphia Stock Exchange.
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plus book value of debt over total asset, and Size, STD, and Industry are the same as deﬁned
earlier in Equation (1). Those authors ﬁnd that all variables are signiﬁcantly related to PIN except
Accrual. Given the close relation between the EO model and the DY model, it is possible that
the same ﬁrm characteristics also affect APIN and PSOS. Therefore, we estimate the ﬁrst order
difference version of Equation (3) using pooled observations of both the listing and control stocks:
dY =b0Listing+b1dSize+b2dGrowth+b3dAnalyst+b4dTurnover+b5dInsider
+b6dInstitution+b7dROA+b8dSTD+b9dTobinQ+η, (4)
where Listing is a dummy variable equal to one for listing stocks and zero for control stocks, and
all the other variables are annual changes after option listing. The dependent variables dY are
changes of all the DY model parameters and constructs examined in previous analysis. All of
the three order ﬂow variables are calculated as the natural logarithm of the DY model estimates.
Accrual is dropped from the model because it is not related to PIN. Also excluded from the model
are Age and Industry because the change in the ﬁrm age is identical for all stocks and the industry
classiﬁcation is unlikely to change.
The sample size decreases slightly after merging the DY model estimates with ﬁrm character-
istics extracted from several other databases. The balance sheet items are from the COMPUSTAT
database. Analyst coverage is from the I/B/E/S and is assigned zero if no record is found for the
ﬁrm. Insider holding data are from the Thomson Reuters. There are 1,256 listing stocks and 1,283
control stocks with all ﬁrm characteristics available after data merging. Table 6 reports the OLS re-
gression results. Across the columns, the listing dummy has negative but insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients
for the two probability parameters (α and θ), positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for all three order
ﬂow variables (μ, δ, and ε), and negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for both APIN and PSOS,
again consistent with the main results. Given the pre-listing averages of 15.5% and 31.7% for list-
ing stocks’ APIN and PSOS, the estimated reductions of 1.4% and 3% in APIN and PSOS in this
table translate to about 10% of the original value. The economic signiﬁcance in this multivariate
test is therefore at the same order of magnitude as the main test on the percentage changes in APIN
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and PSOS contained in Table 4.
[Table 6 about here]
4.2.4. Dynamic analysis
Event studies examining long event windows could potentially generate spurious inferences. For
example, if the structural break occurs a few months before the option listing date, comparing
information in the two annual event windows before and after listing may still generate similar
results. To explore the dynamic effects of option listing, we estimate the DY model for four
quarters before and after the option listing date. Event quarter −1 is deﬁned as trading days [−73,
−11] relative to the option listing date (day 0) and event quarter 1 is deﬁned as trading days [11,
73]. The rest of the event quarters are deﬁned in a similar way so that each event quarter contains 63
trading days.13 We exclude the estimates with corner solutions and examine the quarterly treatment
effects from option listing in Table 7.
The ﬁrst column shows that the number of paired observations in each event quarter is between
1513 and 1515, indicating that the majority of the sample is free from the corner solution problem
in estimation. The second column shows that there is a marginal increase in the probability of
information events, α in quarter 2, which then quickly reverses in quarter 3. There is no signiﬁcant
treatment effect on α in the other event quarters. No signiﬁcant listing effect is observed on the
probability of liquidity shocks (θ) in any event quarter in Column (3). Column (4) shows that
the treatment effect on the informed order ﬂow, μ, is signiﬁcant in two event quarters, 1, and 3.
Average μ of the listing stocks increases by 12% over the control stocks (t-statistic = 3) in quarter
1, making it the biggest quarterly change in terms of both magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance
across all quarters. Column (5) shows that the liquidity shock order ﬂow, δ, also receives signiﬁcant
treatment effect in the ﬁrst quarter after option listing. The increase in δ is 19.7% with a t-statistic
of 4.89. A mild reversal in δ is found in quarter 3 (−7.6% with a t-statistic of −1.92). Column (6)
shows that the arrival rate of uninformed trading (ε) experiences consistent increase over all event
13Further increasing the granularity of the analysis may have insufﬁcient number of observations to reliably estimate
the DY model.
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quarters, indicating that the stock liquidity generally improves around option listing. However, the
most signiﬁcant increase in ε occurs in quarter 1. The treatment effect of 12.5% (t-statistic = 6.1)
in the ﬁrst quarter is more than double the effect from any other quarter. Column (7) shows that
the probability of informed trading (APIN) is signiﬁcantly reduced by more than 5% (t-statistic
= −3.36) in the ﬁrst quarter after option listing. There is further reduction in APIN in the two
following quarters amounting to 3.4% together. However, these changes are no longer statistically
signiﬁcant in individual quarters. Finally, the last column shows that the listing stocks exhibit
some changes in the probability of a trade from liquidity shocks (PSOS) only before listing but not
after. We also calculate the cumulative change relative to the last quarter before listing for all event
quarters after listing. Not surprisingly, the cumulative change is always positive and signiﬁcant
for μ, δ, and ε, and always negative and signiﬁcant for APIN. The cumulative change of PSOS
becomes signiﬁcantly negative in the second quarter after listing. The dynamic analysis results in
this table support the causal effects from option listing on the information environment because
the most signiﬁcant impact occurs in the ﬁrst quarter after listing.14
[Table 7 about here]
4.2.5. A quasi-natural experiment on option listing
Causal effects from option listings are at the center of the analysis. However, the inference from
PSM analysis so far can be impeded by missing variables in the selection process if these variables
affect the listing decisions and the information environment at the same time. To address this
concern, this subsection examines an alternative matched sample in a quasi-natural experiment of
option listing. The SEC mandates a minimum stock price requirement for option listing, which
creates discontinuity in the probability of option listing. If two stocks share similar characteristics
including stock prices but only one stock marginally meets the listing standard, the listing decision
14We also conduct an additional placebo test to conﬁrm the timing of structural breaks using randomized event
dates. Speciﬁcally, for each pair of listing and control stocks, a pseudo-event date is randomly chosen from last three
months before the option listing date. Then we replicate the baseline analysis using one quarter’s data before and after
the pseudo-event date. The results show no signiﬁcant treatment effect from these pseudo events. These results are
available upon request.
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is then more likely a result from the exogenous listing standard. Such observations are useful in
identifying the causal effect from the treatment, i.e. option listing in this case. To ﬁnd the listing
stocks on the margin, we include only listing stocks with prices above the mandated minimum
price by less than one dollar at the time of listing.15 There are 56 such listing events during the
sample period. To ﬁnd the control sample, we ﬁrst construct a sample of non-listing common
stocks that have prices below the minimum price requirement by less than one dollar, but meet
all the other requirements. Then the same logistic regression is estimated for Equation (1), and
the non-listing stock with the closest propensity of listing at the same time is matched to a listing
stock.
Table 8 replicates the baseline analysis in this alternative sample. Despite relatively small
sample size, similar dynamics in the DY model parameters and constructs are found in this table.
Focusing on the treatment effect in the last column, it is clear that all of the three order ﬂow vari-
ables receive signiﬁcant and positive treatment effects from option listing, but the two probability
variables do not. The magnitude of the increase in the informed order ﬂow (μ) is again dwarfed
by those in the liquidity shock order ﬂow (δ) and uninformed order ﬂow (ε). As a result, APIN
signiﬁcantly reduces by 14.5% with a t-statistic of−2.36. The treatment effect on liquidity shocks
(PSOS), however, is not statistically signiﬁcant in this sample although the estimated average effect
is negative and large (−10.7%, t-statistic = −1.18). The results in this quasi-natural experiment
support the causal effect from option listing on the information environment and the estimated
dynamics are consistent with the main ﬁndings.
[Table 8 about here]
4.2.6. A placebo test on ETF options
The analysis so far excludes ETF options because private information is usually ﬁrm-speciﬁc and
affects the price of common stocks more than diversiﬁed stock portfolios such as ETFs. However,
the liquidity effect can exist for ETF options because of increased hedging trades. Therefore,
15The minimum price is set to $7.5 until end of 2002 and is set to $3 thereafter because the ﬁrst low-price listing on
GSS occurs in January 2003.
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the overall information risk can still decrease but the mechanism is different. This subsection
examines the option listing effect on ETFs as a placebo test. There are 85 ETFs that experience
option introductions and have enough information to compute the selection variables during the
same sample period. We also estimate the propensity of option listing for ETFs only in a separate
logit regression and construct a control sample of ETFs. The previous difference-in-difference
analysis on the DY model parameters is repeated in this matched ETF sample. Table 9 shows that
for the DY model parameters, there are signiﬁcant listing effects on the uninformed order ﬂow (ε),
but not on the informed order ﬂow (μ, t-statistic = 0.27). The increase in ε reaches 48% with a
t-statistic of 4.76. The probability of informed trading (APIN) is also reduced in this sample at
an even larger magnitude (−23%) than the effect in the common stock sample (−8.8%) because
informed trading does not become more active in the ETFs after option listing. The effect on PSOS
is absent. The results of this placebo test suggest that although option listing increases liquidity in
general, the effect on informed trading is found only on common stocks, consistent with the notion
that informed trading is more relevant for individual stocks than diversiﬁed stock portfolios.
[Table 9 about here]
4.3. Heterogenous listing effects
To test the heterogenous listing effects in the cross section as stated in Hypotheses 4 and 5, we
merge the main sample with additional databases. To measure options market liquidity, we extract
options volume data from the Option Metrics database. The daily options volume is the aggregate
trading volume of all option contracts on the same stock. The options to stock volume ratio, O/S,
is then the aggregate options volume scaled by the stock trading volume on the same day. We
calculate the average daily options volume (OpVol) and average daily O/S ratio in the ﬁrst year
after listing for each listing stock to measure the options market activeness.
To measure the listing stock’s information environment before listing, we calculate the follow-
ing proxies using stock price data from CRSP, ﬁnancial statements from COMPUSTAT, analyst,
earnings, and voluntary disclosure information from I/B/E/S, and ownership data from Thomson
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Reuter’s 13f ﬁlings database.
• Spread: Average daily closing bid-ask spread scaled by the midpoint of the bid and ask in
the year before listing. Classic market microstructure theories such as Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1992) suggest that information risk widens the dealer’s bid-
ask spread.
• Size: Market capitalization in logarithm at the end of the month before listing. Large ﬁrms
tend to be more transparent because more attention from investors are given to them.
• Analyst: Number of analysts following the stock in the year before listing. Greater coverage
of analysts generally reduces information asymmetry.
• |SUE|: Average absolute earnings surprise of four quarters before listing, where earnings
surprise is calculated as the actual earnings minus the median analyst forecast scaled by the
stock price at the end of the previous month. It is more difﬁcult to forecast earnings for
opaque ﬁrms, leading to larger magnitude of earnings surprise. Therefore, ﬁrms with weak
information environment usually have large |SUE|.
• Guidance: A dummy variable that equals one for ﬁrms that issue any earnings guidance
in the year before listing, and zero otherwise. Managers’ voluntary disclosure is an impor-
tant information channel as shown by Balakrishnan, Billings, Kelly, and Ljungqvist (2014).
Firms issuing earnings guidance should have more transparent information environment.
• InstHolding: Average fraction of shares held by institutional investors in four quarters be-
fore listing. Higher institutional holding is likely to reduce information asymmetry because
with signiﬁcant risk exposure from large positions, institutional investors have the incentive
to collect private information as argued by Amihud and Li (2006).
• NumInst: Number of institutional investors at the time of listing.
• AccrualQuality: Standard deviation of residuals from a regression of current accruals on
lagged, current, and future cash ﬂows from operations as in Dechow and Dichev (2002). We
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run the regressions using quarterly data from three years before listing. Dechow and Dichev
(2002) argue that a close mapping between accounting accruals and cash is more desirable in
terms of accounting quality, leading to a small standard deviation of residuals in the proposed
regression. Therefore, AccrualQuality is inversely related to information transparency.
For each conditioning variable, the listing stocks are sorted into quintile portfolios by ascending
order except for Guidance, which allows us to separate the sample into only two groups of ﬁrms
that either issue (High) or do not issue (Low) earnings guidance. Table 10 presents the average
treatment effect on APIN for each quintile portfolio as well as the difference between the top and
bottom quintiles with robust t-statistics.
[Table 10 about here]
We examine the options liquidity effect ﬁrst. Both Columns (1) and (2) show that the listing
effects on APIN are negative in all quintile portfolios except for the lowest options volume andO/S
quintile portfolios, suggesting that reduction of information asymmetry is a general phenomenon
in the cross section of stocks that experience option listings. Moreover, it is clear that the listing
effect becomes stronger (more negative) when options liquidity increases. The difference between
the top and bottom quintile groups reaches −0.218 (−0.16) with a t-statistic of −5.27 (−3.72) for
sorting based on OpVol (O/S). The evidence is consistent with the notion that an active options
market brings more informational beneﬁt to investors, supporting our Hypothesis 4.
Next, we turn to Hypothesis 5, which posits that ﬁrms with weaker information environment
before option listing beneﬁt more. Our analysis generates the following results. First, regardless
of the information proxy we use, the option listing effect on APIN is always negative in all char-
acteristic groups. Second, focusing on the difference between the top and bottom quintile groups,
the listing effect is stronger (more negative) for stocks with large bid-ask spread, small market
capitalization, low analyst coverage, large absolute earnings surprise, little earnings guidance, low
institutional ownership, low number of institutional investors, and low accrual quality. Since such
ﬁrms are typically less transparent, the evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 5 that opaque ﬁrms
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beneﬁt more from option listings. Finally, the average difference between the top and bottom char-
acteristic groups is statistically signiﬁcant for all information environment measures except analyst
coverage and the t-statistics range between 1.86 and 3.06.
4.4. short-sale constraint and option listing effects
Out of the six parameters in the DY model, the analysis so far excludes the probability of in-
formation being good, β, because this parameter does not affect the calculation of either APIN
or PSOS. However, β can also be affected by option listing if getting around short-sale con-
straints is an important motivation of informed traders. In this subsection, we examine the role
of short sale constraints in option listing effects on APIN. Speciﬁcally, following Brennan, Huh,
and Subrahmanyam (2015), we decompose APIN into a probability of informed trading based on
good news (APIN Good = β ∗APIN) and a probability of informed trading based on bad news
(APIN Bad = (1−β)∗APIN) and investigate the asymmetric effect from option listing.
In Table 11, we replicate the option listing effect analysis in Table 3 on β, APIN Good, and
APIN Bad. Panel A reports the average estimates before and after listing. The listing stocks have
an average β of 0.588 before listing and 0.566 after listing. The control stocks have an average
β of 0.572 before listing and 0.569 after listing. The fact that β is well above 0.5 in all the peri-
ods indicates that the observed information shocks can be asymmetric. This could be due to the
short-sale constraints in place because the estimated probability of bad news can be lower than
the true probability of bad news if informed traders cannot trade ahead of negative news under
binding short-sale constraints. A large β also makes APIN Good greater than APIN Bad in the
sample. In Panel B, we ﬁnd β reduces by 5% for the listing stocks (t-statistic = −5.48) but does
not have a signiﬁcant reduction in the sample of control stocks (t-statistic = −0.73). As a result,
the treatment effect on β is negative and signiﬁcant (−2.9%, t-statistic = −3.04). The negative op-
tion listing effect on β is consistent with the notion that options help informed traders get around
the short-sale constraints on the underlying stocks and the stock has a greater chance of experi-
encing selling pressure after option listing. Turning to the asymmetric effects on the probability of
informed trading, we ﬁnd that both APIN Good and APIN Bad have negative and signiﬁcant treat-
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ment effects. However, the effect on APIN Good is almost three times that on APIN Bad (−14.9%
versus −5.4%) and the t-statistic is also much larger on APIN Good (−5.93 versus −1.68). The
results support our Hypothesis 6 that option listing has asymmetric effects on the probability of
informed trading and the reduction in APIN Good is larger than the reduction in APIN Bad. In
Panels C and D, we replicate the conditional analysis on APIN Good and APIN Bad in the cross
section. The results can be summarized as follows. First, the option listing effects on APIN Good
and APIN Bad have the same sign as the effect on APIN for all the conditioning variables. This
means that both options liquidity and listing stock’s information environment affect APIN Good
as well as APIN Bad. Second, comparing the conditional option listing effect based on options
liquidity in the ﬁrst two columns, it seems that the impact of options liquidity is comparable be-
tween APIN Good and APIN Bad in terms of both the high minus low result and statistical sig-
niﬁcance. Third, the option listing stock’s information environment has a more signiﬁcant impact
on APIN Good than APIN Bad because signiﬁcant difference in APIN Good between the high
and low groups is found for Spread, |SUE|, and Guidance while such signiﬁcant difference in
APIN Bad exists only for |SUE|. The results in the last two panels are again consistent with the
asymmetric effect of option listing on the probability of informed trading.
[Table 11 about here]
4.5. Option listing and price efﬁciency
If options trading reveals private information, the information value of earnings announcements
will become lower after option listing. Empirically, Skinner (1990), Ho (1993), and Mendenhall
and Fehrs (1999) ﬁnd mixed evidence regarding the role of options in conveying earnings infor-
mation for stocks with options. We examine this question in a matched sample based on the option
listing probability using a ﬁxed effect regression method because some stocks do not have analyst
forecasts in the I/B/E/S database in some quarters. Speciﬁcally, we regress the cumulative abnor-
mal return from days [−1,1] on the earnings surprise (SUE), the option listing dummy (Listing), a
time dummy (A f ter) that equals one for observations after listing and zero otherwise, and interac-
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tions of these variables. The option listing effect is identiﬁed by the three-way interaction variable
of SUE, Listing, and A f ter. We include ﬁrm and year ﬁxed effects in the regressions and apply
year clustering in calculating the t-statistics. Table 12 reports the results. Column (1) shows that in
the univariate model, the stock price response to earnings surprise is positive and signiﬁcant as the
estimated coefﬁcient (0.002) has a t-statistic of 4.31. We add the listing dummy and the interaction
of Listing and SUE to the model in Column (2). The coefﬁcient on SUE remains positive and
signiﬁcant and the coefﬁcient of the interaction term SUE ∗ Listing is negative with a t-statistic
of −1.89, indicating that on average, the option listing stocks have lower price response to earn-
ings surprise conditioning on the level of surprise. Column (3) includes the time dummy A f ter,
its interactions with SUE and Listing, and the three-way interaction. The variable of interest, the
three-way interaction, has a coefﬁcient estimate of −0.008 with a t-statistic of −3.2. The negative
and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient indicates that the price sensitivity to earnings surprise becomes weaker
for option listing stocks after listing, supporting Hypothesis 7.16
There might be concerns that stock prices do not immediately adjust to the new fundamental
value upon information shocks and a post announcement drift can exist due to inefﬁcient pricing.
The weaker immediate price response to earnings surprise after option listing does not necessarily
indicate improved price efﬁciency if the information is incorporated later into prices, resulting in
a larger drift. To address the concern, we also investigate the post-earnings announcement drift
(PEAD) measured as the cumulative returns between 20 and 60 days after the announcement.
In Columns (4) to (6) of Table 12, we replicate the price efﬁciency analysis using PEAD as the
dependent variable. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant price drift in all three columns because the coefﬁcient
estimate of SUE has t-statistics above 4.6, suggesting that earnings information is not immediately
impounded. However, there is no evidence that this drift is exacerbated by option listing because
the coefﬁcient estimate of the three-way interaction in Column (3) is not positive and signiﬁcant.
Rather, it has a negative sign but is statistically insigniﬁcant. Therefore, the weaker immediate
price response to earnings surprise must be due to pre-announcement arrival of information to the
market.
16In Section F of the internet appendix, we test the effect on price efﬁciency using delayed price response to order
imbalance following Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004). The results also support the hypothesis that price efﬁciency
improves after option listing.
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[Table 12 about here]
4.6. Other option listing effects
Concerning that APIN may not well capture the information risk, we examine the option listing
effect on ﬁve additional stock market metrics in this subsection, including the percentage bid-
ask spread (Spread), absolute order imbalance (AVOI), return standard deviation (STD), realized
volatility (RVol)) deﬁned as the squared root of the daily sum of ﬁve-minute return squares, and
VPIN of Easley, Lopez de Prado, and O’Hara (2012). VPIN is proposed as an alternative measure
of information asymmetry based on the original PIN model:
VPIN = ∑
n
τ=1 |VSτ −VBτ |
nV
, (5)
whereVSτ ,VBτ , andV are the seller-initiated, buyer-initiated, and total volumes in a bucket, and n is
the number of buckets in a measurement window (say, a day). The buckets are divided in volume
time so that each bucket contains the same number of shares traded. Compared to the original PIN,
VPIN is more ﬂexible and utilizes the volume information. This paper follows Easley, Lopez de
Prado, and O’Hara (2012) to use 50 buckets in calculating daily VPIN. Spread, AVOI, STD, and
VPIN are calculated on a daily basis and then averaged in the two annual event windows before and
after option listings. STD is calculated using all daily observations in the annual event windows.
All these variables should be positively correlated with the level of information asymmetry.
Table 13 examines the option listing effects on these variables. We ﬁnd that the average bid-
ask spread decreases by 45.3% in the listing group and by 28.1% in the control group after option
listing. The treatment effect of option listing is −17.2% with a t-statistic of −10.12. Analysis on
AVOI, as an approximation of the expected value of PIN, shows that trading becomes more bal-
anced after option listing. The average annual imbalance decreases by 23.4% for the listing stocks
and 13.3% for the control stocks. The difference between the two groups averages at −10.1%
and is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Similar to Mayhew and Mihov (2004), our results do not show
that option listing signiﬁcantly reduces the return standard deviation. Although the listing stocks
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have an average decrease of 2.4% in STD, the control stocks have an average decrease of 1.9%,
making the difference of −0.5% statistically insigniﬁcant. However, when we turn to the realized
volatility (RVol), we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant reduction after option listing. Table 13 shows that RVol
reduces by 24% for the listing stocks (t-statistic = −6.32), but no signiﬁcant change in RVol of
the control stocks. As a result, the treatment effect is −19.3%, statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
level (t-statistic = −4.02). It seems that although option listing does not reduce the standard de-
viation of daily returns, it does signiﬁcantly reduce intraday volatilities. Finally, we ﬁnd that the
averageVPIN decreases by 19.3% for the listing stocks and 9.5% for the control stocks. The treat-
ment effect is −9.8%, statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (t-statistic = −17.38). Collectively,
these results suggest that using alternative measures of information asymmetry, option listing still
signiﬁcantly reduces the level of asymmetry.
[Table 13 about here]
5. Conclusion
This article investigates the impact of option introductions on the information environment of the
overall market. Between February 11, 2001 and February 28, 2010, we match each of the 1517
option listing stocks to an eligible, but non-listing, stock in the same month, and study the treatment
effects of option listing on several stock market metrics based on the Duarte and Young (2009)
model. The results show that option listing signiﬁcantly reduces the probability of informed trading
by 8.8% in the year after listing. Also reduced is the impact of liquidity shocks. Both informed and
uninformed trading increase after option listing but the probability of information events does not
change compared to the control group. The decline in the risk of trading against an informed trader
is due to disproportional increases in the informed and uninformed trading. The results are robust
to several alternative empirical methods including relaxing the full delta hedging assumption and
using alternative order ﬂow calculations, and exist in subsamples of stocks and after controlling for
ﬁrm characteristics associated with the probability of informed trading. Dynamic analysis shows
that the most signiﬁcant structural break occurs in the ﬁrst quarter after option listings. A quasi-
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natural experiment also conﬁrms the causal effects of option listing by comparing stocks on the
margin of the SEC requirement of option listing. A placebo test on ETF options shows that there is
no signiﬁcant change in the level of informed trading in these securities after option listing although
the increased uninformed trading also reduces information risk. Consistent with our hypotheses,
we also ﬁnd that the listing effects are stronger for stocks with active otions trading and weak
information environment before listing. Short-sale constraints play an important role in the option
listing effects as the listing effect is stronger for the probability of informed trading based on good
news than bad news. Finally, we ﬁnd immediate stock price response to earnings surprise weakens
after options listing without post-earnings announcement drift becoming stronger, indicating that
the stock price efﬁciency improves after listing.
The ﬁndings suggest that information content in the options market documented by previous
studies such as Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998), Pan and Poteshman (2006), and Hu (2014)
does not come only from driving informed traders out of the stock market. Option introductions
reduce the overall information risk and improve market liquidity. There is a net gain of information
efﬁciency from options trading on top of substitutional effects to stock trading. The current analy-
sis does not include informed trading on stock return volatilities. It is important to jointly analyze
informed trading on both the stock price and the return volatility to uncover a more comprehensive
picture of the options trading effects. Private information about volatility is proﬁtable in the op-
tions market, but not so in the stock market given mixed empirical relations between the return and
volatilities. Grossman (1988) points out that even if options can be synthesized by a dynamic trad-
ing strategy, the real trading process transmits volatility information that will not be revealed by the
dynamic trading strategy. Back (1993) shows that information asymmetry and option introductions
together cause stochastic volatility in the underlying market. Informed trading on volatility in the
options market is unlikely to bias the results in this study because it has neutral impact on the stock
prices and order imbalance if volatility traders use delta-neutral strategies such as straddles, or if
both volatility traders and option market makers dynamically hedge the delta exposure of their op-
tion positions. The hedging transactions on the stock market can increase the total trading volume
but will not make the stock order ﬂow imbalanced. Therefore, these hedging trades can be viewed
as liquidity trades in the stock market. Empirically, it is difﬁcult to study the option listing effect
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on volatility trading because volatility trading is unobservable without options trading. Moreover,
current microstructure theories are unable to produce empirical measures to disentangle informed
trading on stock volatilities from that on stock prices. Without a reliable identiﬁcation strategy of
informed volatility trading, we leave the challenge to future studies. It would also be interesting to
explore the role of index funds, ETFs, hedge funds, and other institutional investors in the increase
of trading demand post option listing.
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Table 1
Number of option listing events over time
The table reports the time series distribution of the number of stocks selected for option listing
between February 11, 2001 and February 28, 2010 as well as for the ﬁrm-month observations that
are qualiﬁed for option listing but not selected. The selection criteria include: (1) the underlying
must be listed on NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ, or any other national stock exchange; (2) the stock
price is not below $3.00; (3) there must be at least seven million publicly-held shares; (4) there
must be at least 252 trading days prior to this date; (5) the listing stocks must have options trading
for at least 252 days after listing.














Determinants of option listing: logistic regression results
This table presents the regression results from a logit model for the option listing decisions. The
sample includes all ﬁrm-month observations that meet the option listing criteria between February
11, 2001 and February 28, 2010. The dependent variable is equal to one for the ﬁrm-month obser-
vation when an options exchange listed a stock without options traded on it previously, and zero
otherwise. The independent variables are log market capitalization (Sizet−1) in the last month, log
average daily trading volume in the past 12 months (Volumet−1,t−12), log average daily volume in
the last month (Volumet−1), log average daily volume in month t−12 (Volumet−12), log standard
deviation of daily returns in the past year (STDt−1,t−12), log standard deviation of daily returns
in the last month (STDt−1), log standard deviation of daily returns in month t − 12 (STDt−12),
average daily percentage bid-ask spread at market close in the past year (Spreadt−1,t−12), aver-
age daily closing spread in the last month (Spreadt−1), average daily closing spread in month
t− 12 (Spreadt−12), average daily volume order imbalance in the past year (VOIt−1,t−12), aver-
age daily volume order imbalance in the last month (VOIt−1), average daily volume order imbal-
ance in month t− 12 (VOIt−12), average daily absolute volume order imbalance in the past year
(AVOIt−1,t−12), average daily absolute volume order imbalance in the last month (AVOIt−1), aver-
age daily absolute volume order imbalance in month t−12 (AVOIt−12), institutional ownership last
month (Institutiont−1), institutional ownership one year ago (Institutiont−12), 71 two-digit SIC
industry dummies, and year dummies. Associated t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗denote
statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Model (1) (2) (3)
Intercept −19.560 −19.769 −11.143
(−0.09) (−0.09) (−0.07)
Sizet−1 0.115∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.027
(3.51) (4.21) (0.76)
Volumet−1,t−12 −1.137∗∗∗ −0.769∗∗∗ −1.217∗∗∗
(−18.79) (−9.48) (−13.15)






Model (1) (2) (3)
STDt−1,t−12 0.676∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗
(7.34) (3.58) (2.71)




Spreadt−1,t−12 −0.132∗∗ −0.294∗∗∗ 0.077
(−2.26) (−4.39) (1.22)




















Industry Fixed Effects yes yes yes
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes
McFadden’s R2 2.08% 2.12% 2.49%
Accuracy Ratio 85.7% 86% 87.6%
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Table 3
Option listing effects on market information environment
This table reports the option listing effect on the market information environment estimated using the Duarte
and Young (2009) model. For each of 1517 listing stocks between February 11, 2001 and February 28,
2010, a control stock is chosen based on the predicted probability of option listing from Model (3) in
Table 2. For both listing and control stocks, Panel A reports the averages of the probability of information
events (α); the probability of a symmetry liquidity shock (θ); log daily order arrival rate of informed trades
(μ); log additional uninformed order arrival rate on liquidity shock days (δ); log daily order arrival rate of
uninformed trades (ε); the adjusted probability of informed trading (APIN); and the probability of a liquidity
order from symmetric liquidity shocks (PSOS) estimated in one year before and after the listing date. Panel
B reports the treatment effect of option listing on these variables. For each variable, the percentage change
is calculated as the natural logarithm of the post-listing value minus the natural logarithm of the pre-listing
value. The cross-sectional mean and associated t-statistics calculated using year-clustered standard errors
(in parentheses) are then reported for the listing stocks, the control stocks, and the paired difference between
these two groups. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Averages of DY model parameters and constructs
Listing stocks Control stocks
Before After Before After
α 0.304 0.322 0.300 0.314
θ 0.212 0.208 0.206 0.205
log(μ) 7.085 7.302 6.954 7.047
log(δ) 7.463 7.753 7.295 7.446
log(ε) 6.213 6.805 6.003 6.355
APIN 0.155 0.133 0.160 0.149
PSOS 0.317 0.262 0.307 0.274
Panel B: Option listing effect
Listing stocks Control stocks Listing − Control
α 0.058∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ −0.038
(1.97) (2.99) (−0.87)
θ −0.026 0.011 −0.037
(−0.95) (0.36) (−0.90)
μ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(7.81) (3.12) (3.07)
δ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(10.67) (5.18) (3.51)
ε 0.592∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(33.74) (18.62) (10.01)
APIN −0.157∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗
(−16.78) (−7.07) (−6.71)




Deviation from full delta hedging
This table relaxes the full delta hedging assumption in the main analysis and reexamines option listing
effects on the market information environment estimated using the Duarte and Young (2009) model. For
each of 1517 listing stocks between February 11, 2001 and February 28, 2010, a control stock is chosen
based on the predicted probability of option listing from Model (3) in Table 2. For listing stocks, the
model estimation after listing uses adjusted daily buyer- and seller-initiated stock volumes. Speciﬁcally,
both buy and sell stock volumes are increased by half of the potentially unhedged options volume, equal to
25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% of the total options volume of the same stock on the same day. Reported are the
treatment effects of option listing on the probability of information events (α); the probability of a symmetry
liquidity shock (θ); daily order arrival rate of informed trades (μ); additional uninformed order arrival rate
on liquidity shock days (δ); daily order arrival rate of uninformed trades (ε); the adjusted probability of
informed trading (APIN); and the probability of a liquidity order from symmetric liquidity shocks (PSOS).
For each variable, the percentage change is calculated as the natural logarithm of the post-listing value minus
the natural logarithm of the pre-listing value and the treatment effect is the paired difference between the
listing and control stocks. Associated t-statistics calculated using year-clustered standard errors are reported
in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Unhedged options volume
25% 50% 75% 100%
α −0.039 −0.042 −0.038 −0.045
(−0.93) (−1.03) (−0.84) (−0.95)
θ −0.037 −0.036 −0.035 −0.033
(−0.86) (−0.89) (−0.88) (−0.75)
μ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(2.89) (3.27) (3.15) (2.96)
δ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(3.63) (3.68) (3.39) (3.66)
ε 0.247∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗
(11.66) (11.02) (12.03) (11.05)
APIN −0.082∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗
(−6.84) (−6.23) (−6.10) (−5.48)
PSOS −0.074∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗
(−4.19) (−5.58) (−5.12) (−5.64)
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Table 5
Robustness checks of the option listing effects
For each of 1517 listing stocks between February 11, 2001 and February 28, 2010, a control stock
is chosen based on the predicted probability of option listing from Model (3) in Table 2. Using
the Duarte and Young (2009) model, this table examines the robustness of option listing effects on
the averages of the probability of information events (α); the probability of a symmetry liquidity
shock (θ); daily order arrival rate of informed trades (μ); additional uninformed order arrival rate on
liquidity shock days (δ); daily order arrival rate of uninformed trades (ε); the adjusted probability of
informed trading (APIN); and the probability of a liquidity order from symmetric liquidity shocks
(PSOS) estimated in one year before and after the listing date. For each variable, the percentage
change is calculated as the natural logarithm of the post-listing value minus the natural logarithm
of the pre-listing value for both listing and control stocks. The cross-sectional mean and associated
t-statistics calculated using year-clustered standard errors (in parentheses) are then reported for the
the paired difference between the two groups. In Column (1), the model parameters are estimated
using the number of trades. Columns (2) and (3) report results in the subsamples of NASDAQ
stocks, and NYSE and AMEX stocks, respectively. The ﬁnancial crisis period of 2008 and 2009 is
excluded in Column (4). Columns (5) and (6) report the results in subsamples that involve option
listing on CBOE and non-CBOE exchanges, respectively. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗denote statistical signiﬁcance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of trades NASDAQ NYSE+AMEX ex-GFC CBOE non-CBOE
α −0.019 −0.080 0.008 −0.034 −0.001 −0.066
(−0.65) (−1.28) (0.13) (−0.70) (−0.02) (−1.14)
θ −0.050∗ −0.082 0.012 −0.046 −0.035 −0.039
(−1.70) (−1.46) (0.20) (−0.97) (−0.54) (−0.73)
μ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.107∗ 0.143∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.099∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(5.78) (1.87) (2.50) (2.68) (1.80) (2.68)
δ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.133∗∗
(6.00) (2.00) (2.99) (3.04) (2.46) (2.51)
ε 0.385∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(5.80) (5.97) (8.60) (8.79) (8.55) (5.77)
APIN −0.084∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗
(−7.63) (−5.24) (−4.19) (−6.06) (−5.95) (−3.77)
PSOS −0.108∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.044∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗
(−7.02) (−4.75) (−1.83) (−4.63) (−3.93) (−2.54)
N 1517 791 726 1163 648 869
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Table 6
Option listing effects controlling for ﬁrm characteristics
The table reports the ordinary least squares regression results in the sample of 1256 option listing
stocks and 1283 control stocks between February 11, 2001 and February 28, 2010:
dY =b0Listing+b1dSize+b2dGrowth+b3dAnalyst+b4dTurnover+b5dInsider
+b6dInstitution+b7dROA+b8dSTD+b9dTobinQ+η,
where all variables are the changes from one year before option listing to one year after, except
Listing, a dummy variable that is equal to one for the listing stocks and zero otherwise. Size is the
natural logarithm of the market capitalization. Growth is the annual growth rate in sales. Analyst
is the number of analysts following the company. Turnover is the annual stock market trading
volume scaled by shares outstanding. Insider is the percentage ownership of company insiders.
Institution is the percentage of shares held by institutional investors. ROA is the return on asset
calculated as net income after depreciation over total asset. STD is the standard deviation of the
daily returns. TobinQ is the market value of equity plus book value of debt over total asset. The
dependent variables are annual changes in the estimates of the Duarte and Young (2009) model
including the probability of information events (α); the probability of a symmetry liquidity shock
(θ); log daily order arrival rate of informed trades (μ); log additional uninformed order arrival
rate on liquidity shock days (δ); log daily order arrival rate of uninformed trades (ε); the adjusted
probability of informed trading (APIN); and the probability of a liquidity order from symmetric
liquidity shocks (PSOS). The associated t-statistics calculated using year-clustered standard errors
are in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Indep.\Dep. dα dθ dlog(μ) dlog(δ) dlog(ε) dAPIN dPSOS
Listing −0.004 −0.004 0.153∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(−0.56) (−0.89) (4.13) (5.33) (15.25) (−8.99) (−7.73)
dSize 0.065 −0.055 0.322∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗
(0.84) (−0.77) (4.64) (6.11) (12.76) (−3.94) (−4.96)
dGrowth 0.002 −0.001 0.000 0.003 ∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(1.03) (−0.55) (0.32) (2.43) (2.88) (−0.82) (−0.03)
dAnalyst 0.130∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗ 0.065 0.330∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ −0.019 −0.053∗∗
(2.10) (−2.91) (1.17) (6.23) (7.68) (−1.02) (−2.46)
dTurnover 0.001 0.003∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001 0.001∗ 0.000 0.001
(0.67) (2.84) (0.44) (−1.03) (1.67) (−0.43) (1.64)
dInsider −0.004 0.004 0.005 −0.001 0.002 −0.001 0.001
(−0.77) (0.84) (1.11) (−0.21) (0.81) (−0.71) (0.45)
dInstitution 0.339 −0.073 0.224 0.287 1.717 ∗∗∗ −0.426∗∗∗ −0.774∗∗∗
(1.30) (−0.30) (0.95) (1.29) (12.06) (−5.30) (−8.56)
dROA 0.090 −0.040 −0.304∗∗∗ −0.275∗∗∗ −0.287∗∗∗ 0.064∗ −0.037
(0.75) (−0.36) (−2.84) (−2.70) (−4.43) (1.73) (−0.91)
dSTD −0.360∗∗∗ −0.123 0.773∗∗∗ 0.774∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(−4.36) (−1.60) (10.39) (10.95) (8.37) (−2.90) (5.74)
dTobinQ 0.010 0.000 0.054∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.63) (0.00) (3.92) (5.87) (11.51) (−4.18) (−1.23)
Adj R-sq 0.011 0.006 0.063 0.109 0.379 0.097 0.144
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Table 7
Quarterly option listing effects
This table reports the quarterly option listing effects on the model parameters and constructs of
Duarte and Young (2009) around the option listing date. For each of 1517 listing stocks between
February 11, 2001 and February 28, 2010, a control stock is chosen based on the predicted proba-
bility of option listing fromModel (3) in Table 2. Estimates with corner solutions are excluded and
N is the number of paired observations in each event quarter. α is the probability of information
events. θ is the probability of a symmetry liquidity shock. μ is the daily order arrival rate from
informed trades. δ is the increment in uninformed order arrival rate on liquidity shock days. ε is
the daily order arrival rate from uninformed trades. APIN is the adjusted probability of informed
trading. PSOS is the probability of a trade from liquidity shocks. For each variable, the treatment
effect is calculated as the difference in the quarterly percentage changes between the listing stocks
and the control stocks. The cross-sectional mean and t-statistics calculated using year-clustered
standard errors (in parentheses) of the treatment effects are then reported in event quarters rela-
tive to the option listing date. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Event quarter N α θ μ δ ε APIN PSOS
−3 1514 0.021 −0.011 0.053 0.059 0.043∗∗ 0.020 −0.007
(0.54) (−0.32) (1.31) (1.50) (2.24) (1.27) (−0.44)
−2 1513 −0.006 0.049 0.017 0.032 0.037∗ −0.025 0.035∗∗
(−0.15) (1.36) (0.45) (0.86) (1.95) (−1.33) (2.07)
−1 1515 0.038 −0.009 −0.036 −0.041 0.030 0.000 −0.053∗∗∗
(0.96) (−0.26) (−0.86) (−1.01) (1.61) (−0.02) (−3.06)
1 1514 −0.033 −0.055 0.120∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ 0.014
(−0.83) (−1.48) (3.00) (4.89) (6.10) (−3.36) (0.78)
2 1515 0.068∗ −0.011 −0.049 0.042 0.055∗∗∗ −0.010 −0.017
(1.77) (−0.32) (−1.28) (1.06) (3.33) (−0.62) (−0.99)
3 1513 −0.81∗ 0.051 0.078∗∗ −0.076∗ 0.020 −0.024 −0.016
(−1.92) (1.46) (2.03) (−1.92) (1.21) (−1.43) (−0.95)
4 1514 0.009 −0.049 0.003 0.036 0.012 0.005 −0.021
(0.23) (−1.40) (0.07) (0.90) (0.73) (0.28) (−1.15)
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Table 8
A quasi-natural experiment on option listing
This table reports the option listing effects in a quasi-natural experiment. The sample includes 56 listing
stocks with prices above the SEC mandated minimum price by less than one dollar between February 11,
2001 and February 28, 2010. Control stocks are the non-listing stocks with prices below the SEC mandated
minimum price by less than one dollar. Each listing stock is then matched to a control stock at the same
time that has the closest predicted probability of option listing. Reported are the average treatment effects
on Duarte and Young (2009) model’s parameters and constructs including the probability of information
events (α); the probability of a symmetry liquidity shock (θ); daily order arrival rate of informed trades (μ);
additional uninformed order arrival rate on liquidity shock days (δ); daily order arrival rate of uninformed
trades (ε); the adjusted probability of informed trading (APIN); and the probability of a liquidity order
from symmetric liquidity shocks (PSOS) estimated in one year before and after the listing date. For each
variable, the percentage change is calculated as the natural logarithm of the post-listing value minus the
natural logarithm of the pre-listing value. The cross-sectional mean and associated t-statistics calculated
using year-clustered standard errors (in parentheses) are then reported for the listing stocks, the control
stocks, and the paired difference between these two groups. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Listing stocks Control stocks Listing − Control
α −0.064 0.058 −0.121
(−0.36) (0.37) (−0.52)
θ −0.110 0.091 −0.200
(−0.70) (0.65) (−0.93)
μ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.022 0.287∗∗
(2.70) (0.15) (2.19)
δ 0.309∗∗ −0.095 0.404∗
(2.18) (−0.69) (1.82)
ε 0.710∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗ 0.427∗∗
(7.37) (2.05) (2.58)
APIN −0.218∗∗∗ −0.073∗ −0.145∗∗
(−5.03) (−1.74) (−2.36)
PSOS −0.263∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.107
(−3.61) (−3.01) (−1.18)
N 56 56 56
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Table 9
Option listing effects on ETFs
This table examines the option listing effects on the information environment of 85 ETFs between February
11, 2001 and February 28, 2010. For each listing ETF, a control ETF is chosen based on the predicted
probability of option listing from the full-speciﬁcation logistic model in Equation (1). Reported are the
average treatment effects on the probability of information events (α); the probability of a symmetry liquidity
shock (θ); daily order arrival rate of informed trades (μ); additional uninformed order arrival rate on liquidity
shock days (δ); daily order arrival rate of uninformed trades (ε); the adjusted probability of informed trading
(APIN); and the probability of receiving a liquidity order from symmetric liquidity shocks (PSOS) based on
Duarte and Young (2009) model in one year before and after option listing. For each variable, the percentage
change is calculated as the natural logarithm of the post-listing value minus the natural logarithm of the pre-
listing value. The cross-sectional mean and associated t-statistics calculated using year-clustered standard
errors (in parentheses) are then reported for the listing stocks, the control stocks, and the paired difference
between the two groups. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Listing ETFs Control ETFs Listing − Control
α 0.181∗∗ 0.164 0.017
(2.12) (1.57) (0.12)
θ 0.208 0.030 0.179
(1.37) (0.22) (0.85)
μ 0.175∗∗ 0.138 0.040
(2.03) (1.23) (0.27)
δ 0.178 0.006 0.172
(1.41) (0.06) (0.92)
ε 0.704∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗
(8.96) (3.25) (4.76)
APIN −0.139∗∗∗ 0.091 −0.230∗
(−5.04) (0.60) (−1.72)
PSOS −0.103∗ −0.166∗ 0.064
(−1.73) (−1.71) (0.56)



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Decomposing the option listing effects
This table reports the option listing effect on probabilities of directional informed trading estimated using the
Duarte and Young (2009) model. For each of 1517 listing stocks between February 11, 2001 and February
28, 2010, a control stock is chosen based on the predicted probability of option listing from Model (3) in
Table 2. For both listing and control stocks, Panel A reports the averages of the probability of an information
shock being positive (β); the adjusted probability of informed trading for good news (APIN Good); and the
adjusted probability of informed trading for bad news (APIN Bad) estimated in one year before and after the
listing date. Panel B reports the treatment effect of option listing on these variables. For each variable, the
percentage change is calculated as the natural logarithm of the post-listing value minus the natural logarithm
of the pre-listing value. The cross-sectional mean and associated t-statistics calculated using year-clustered
standard errors (in parentheses) are then reported for the listing stocks, the control stocks, and the paired
difference between these two groups. Panels C and D replicate the analysis in Table10 using APIN Good
and APIN Bad. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗denote statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Averages of DY model parameters and constructs
Listing stocks Control stocks
Before After Before After
β 0.588 0.566 0.572 0.569
APIN Good 0.092 0.076 0.091 0.084
APIN Bad 0.063 0.058 0.068 0.065
Panel B: Option listing effect
Listing stocks Control stocks Listing − Control
β −0.050∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.029∗∗∗
(−5.48) (−0.73) (−3.04)
APIN Good −0.210∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗
(−15.72) (−3.80) (−5.93)



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Option listing and price response to earnings surprise
The table investigates the option listing effect on stock price response to earnings surprise. For the listing
stocks and matched control stocks in the study, four quarterly earnings announcements before and after
the listing date are collected. Reported are the OLS regression results with year and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. In
Columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return from days -1 to 1 relative
to the earnings announcement date. In Columns (4) to (6), the dependent variable is the post-earnings an-
nouncement drift (PEAD) calculated as the cumulative returns between 20–60 days after the announcement.
Earnings surprise SUE is calculated as the actual earnings minus the median analyst forecast then scaled
by the stock price at the end of the previous month. Listing is a dummy variable that equals one for op-
tion listing stocks and zero for control stocks. A f ter is a dummy variable that equals one for observations
after the listing date and zero for those before the listing date. Associated t-statistics calculated using year-
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
CAR(-1,1) PEAD(20,60)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(2.41) (2.29) (2.63) (10.11) (3.61) (4.51)
SUE 0.002∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗
(4.31) (3.86) (1.79) (7.36) (7.20) (4.61)
Listing -0.001 0.000 0.018∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(-0.94) (-0.18) (4.06) (4.18)
SUE ∗Listing -0.002∗ -0.002 -0.170∗∗∗ -0.097
(-1.89) (-1.40) (-3.09) (-1.18)
A f ter 0.000 -0.019∗∗∗
(0.26) (-2.77)
SUE ∗A f ter 0.007∗ 0.013
(2.89) (0.16)
Listing∗A f ter -0.001 -0.018∗∗
(-0.68) (-1.98)
SUE ∗Listing∗A f ter -0.008∗ -0.146
(-3.20) (-1.32)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. Rsq 0.121 0.121 0.122 0.106 0.109 0.114
N 19244 19244 19244 19244 19244 19244
63
Table 13
Option listing effects on other stock market metrics
This table analyzes the treatment effects of option listing on Spread, the one-year average of
daily percentage bid-ask spread; AVOI, the one-year average of absolute volume order imbalance;
STD, the one-year standard deviation of daily returns; RVol, the one-year average of daily realized
volatility; and VPIN, the order ﬂow toxicity measure based on Easley, Prado, and O’Hara (2012).
For each of 1517 listing stocks between February 11, 2001 and February 28, 2010, a control stock
is chosen based on the predicted probability of option listing from the full-speciﬁcation logistic
regression in Column (3) of Table 2. For each dependent variable, X , the percentage change is
calculated as the natural logarithm of the post-listing value minus the natural logarithm of the pre-
listing value: log(Xa f ter)− log(Xbe f ore). The cross-sectional mean and the associated t-statistics
calculated using year-clustered standard errors (in parentheses) are then reported for the listing
stocks, the control stocks, and the paired differences between these two groups. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗denote
statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Variable Listing Control Listing - Control
Spread −0.453∗∗∗ −0.281∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗
(−26.65) (−16.53) (−10.12)
AVOI −0.234∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗
(−33.43) (−19.00) (−11.22)
STD −0.024∗∗ −0.019 −0.005
(−2.40) (−1.58) (−0.42)
RVol −0.240∗∗∗ −0.047 −0.193∗∗∗
(−6.32) (−1.24) (−4.02)
VPIN −0.193∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗
(−43.18) (−22.14) (−17.38)
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